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The poem is the cry of its occasion,
Part of the rest itself and not about it.
Wallace Stevens, “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven”
Lauding editors on these occasions is rightly suspect, but here it is 
simply unavoidable. Gary Boire’s pathbreaking, of course, conspectus 
and analysis of colonial law and postcolonial literature provides not only 
a point of departure for my paper but also its generative orientation—a 
continuing on the path already broken.
Briefl y, for now, Boire draws on representations of law in postcolonial 
literatures to reveal a disruptive ambivalence in colonial law. Bluntly, 
for now, I will try to show how that ambivalence also constitutes law, 
and not just colonial law, and try to show how this constitution of law 
can be derived from a quality of literature, and not just postcolonial lit-
eratures. All of which will not involve minimizing or marginalizing the 
postcolonial in its relation to law or to literature. On the contrary, the 
postcolonial will provide the focal opening to these perceptions of law 
and of literature more generally conceived. And, as it will transpire, the 
postcolonial does this with an apt irony, an irony that can be summarily 
derived from Hardt and Negri’s criticism of postcolonial positions. They 
perceive, with some accuracy, that the postcolonial is derived from co-
lonialism. For them that derivation containedly limits the utility of the 
postcolonial to “rereading history” (146). Not for the fi rst time, Hardt 
and Negri fail to see the point of what they are criticizing. The very force 
of the postcolonial comes from its integral yet resistant relation to the 
colonial, and from its thence revealing what is constituently of, and yet 
denied by, that selfsame colonial condition. This is not the revelation of 
some marginal matter but, rather, the disclosure of the very structuring 
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(if the word may still be allowed) of the colonial. It is this effi cacy of the 
resistant within imported by the postcolonial that is brought to bear 
now on the constitution of law generically.
I. On the Immodesty of the Supplement
In a way that captures its pretensions, Boire sees colonial law as the dom-
inating fi gure of colonial settlement and authority, as a hierarchized and 
monadic ordering that would encompass indigenous reality (e.g. 203, 
209, 212). More pointedly, law enacts an interpretation of the social 
that “continues monologically throughout the entire social order by he-
gemonically drawing other areas of production into the perimeters of 
its own fi eld” (203–04). This acquisitive movement of law is bolstered 
in its claim to neutrality and generality, even to universality (204, 209–
10). Inevitably, there results an “implosive ambivalence” in law, and this 
entails a “repression” of what insistently remains counter to law, of what 
transgressively opposes yet constitutes it (202, 204, 207, 211).
Obviously we must return to these rich insights, but continuing in a 
synoptic vein, Boire fi nds in postcolonial literatures a tangible refl ection 
of this ambivalence, and that refl ection is the colonized subject who “is 
both the site of imperial legal inscription and that which threatens this 
very inscription” (204). The threat has something of a patinated quality, 
however. It is manifested as irony, mimicry, as a resistance dependent 
on “its own oppression” (212). Rather more exuberantly, that situated 
threat evokes the carnivalesque and the Saturnalia. Yet the Saturnalia 
must end, the carnival is over for another year. There seems, in all, to be 
some primal effi cacy given to the colonial and to a colonial law whose 
“heterodoxic potential . . . is always subject to the exercise of hierar-
chical orthodoxy” (204). That this accurately depicts an impelling ele-
ment of colonial law, even of law more widely understood, can hardly be 
denied. But what I want to begin putting in place now is something of 
a reversal of emphasis, a putting of “heterodoxical potential” before “hi-
erarchical orthodoxy,” and to do this in the spirit of Tuitt’s brilliant de-
piction of the ability of the postcolonial text, literary or legal, to surpass 
the containment of the colonial, “to go outside the source that is presup-
posed by its very existence” (76). And a beginning can be derived from 
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the extension of carnival in a way that Boire would want, in the compa-
ny of Bakhtin, so as to celebrate, as carnival would, the “liberation from 
the prevailing truth and from the established order,” and so as to elevate 
what always opposes the “immortalized and completed” (see 206). 
The claim to completeness—to an achieved, universalized truth—is 
aptly attributed by Boire to the type of imperialism his postcolonial lit-
erary representatives inhabit, to the nationalist imperialism of the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. This nationalist imperialism laid claim 
to the universal, even though it was the product of particular nations. 
An inexorable logic ensued. The claim was an assertion of an absolute 
truth, a truth exemplifi ed in the particular imperial nation. And this 
exemplarity could not be an identity positively conceived, a positive re-
alization of the universal in the particular. This impossibility had two 
monumental, and contradictory, correlates. For one, the identity came 
to be formed negatively by constituting, for example, the savages as its 
antithesis. So much is commonplace. But analysis has to go further if 
this negative attribution of identity is not simply to reinforce the orig-
inal arrogation of completeness, as happens in such as Said’s circular 
seeing of the West constructing itself in an oppositional reference to an 
Orient also constructed by it (Orientialism). So, to continue, the antith-
esis of the absolute or the universal can only be utterly antithetical. It 
has to be of a totally different kind of existence. Yet, and this is the fur-
ther correlate and where the contradiction comes in, the universal has 
to be all-inclusive. The universalized existence exemplifi ed by the impe-
rial nations was one that all peoples would come to, including the colo-
nized, even if that would take a conveniently long time. Hence, social 
evolution. Yet the claim to the universal, to the absolute, has to remain 
relentless in its exclusion. Since the claim depends upon (for example) 
a savage condition apart, for the claim to stay in existence, the condi-
tion must stay always apart. It has to remain, in an ultimate way, quite 
unredeemable. Put another way, the claim to the universal can never be 
achieved in its own terms. It can never be ‘truly’ universal and thence all-
inclusive because of its dependence on what must remain ever beyond 
it. That which is ever beyond, this intrinsic unsurpassability, marks the 
place of the postcolonial and institutes its “ambivalence.”
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To equate this quality of the postcolonial with law may at fi rst seem 
extravagant. After all, law was at the forefront of the civilizing mission, 
not just a prime carrier, but also a valiant enforcer of colonial truth. And, 
as it came to pass, a blinkered colonial law proved incapable of existing 
beyond this attributed content. We may, for example, feel some faint 
sympathy for a colonial governor of Bombay when he remarked on “the 
perilous experiment of continuing to legislate for millions of people, with 
few means of knowing, except by a rebellion, whether the laws suited 
them or not” (Thornton 181). Yet there are instances, now inadequately 
memorialized, where colonized people seized a colonial law and shaped 
it to their purposes in effecting liberatory transformations.1 Let me now 
take a more prominent illustration of the contrast between law as libera-
tory and law as arrogated truth, an illustration that can carry the remain-
der of my analysis including a “literary supplement” which is rather less 
“modest” than the part Boire would allow such supplementing (213).
II. Mandela 
The illustration is derived, with Derrida’s considerable help, from the 
thought of Nelson Mandela. The genres involved, autobiography and 
the speech from the dock, are at least unusual in engagements with post-
colonial literatures, but they do have a quiddity, which is important for 
my argument and, in any case, their depictions of law will be connected 
to more ‘fi ctional’ genres shortly. 
The momentous puzzle which Mandela presents us, and makes pres-
ent, begins with Mandela as a critic of the laws, a legal realist, in de-
scribing his disenchantment with the rule of law and with the notion of 
equality before the law: 
[M]y career as a lawyer and activist removed the scales from 
my eyes. I saw that there was a wide difference between what I 
had been taught in the lecture room and what I learned in the 
courtroom. I went from having an idealistic view of the law as 
a sort of justice to a perception of the law as a tool used by the 
ruling class to shape society in a way favourable to itself. (Long 
Walk 309)
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And indeed, with the struggle against apartheid, it would be diffi cult 
to conceive of a situation where there was less cause for commitment to 
the laws, or to conceive of a person more intimately justifi ed in refusing 
such commitment. Mandela was certainly perspicacious and forthright 
on the matter of law’s pointed oppressions and failings, and not only in 
its constraining and incipiently deadly effect on him but also, and pri-
marily, in law’s tentactular and pervasive subordination of his “people.”
All of which could be sharply set against another Mandela, a Mandela 
existentially identifi ed with the law, a Mandela who in the very midst 
of a realist critique lauds the court system as “perhaps the only place in 
South Africa where an African could possibly receive a fair hearing and 
where the rule of law might still apply” (Long Walk 308); a Mandela 
who presents himself before the very law he rejects, “rejects in the name 
of a superior law, the very one he declares to admire and before which 
he agrees to appear” (Derrida “Refl ection” 27); a Mandela who “regarded 
it as a duty which I owed, not just to my people, but also to my profes-
sion, to the practice of law, and to justice for all mankind, to cry out 
against this discrimination which is essentially unjust” (qtd. in Derrida 
“Refl ection” 35). Mandela, it would seem is now of “an idealistic view” 
and direct contrary to Mandela the realist, but not so.
The “superior law” which Mandela affi rms is not something set apart 
from, or something about the existent law. Rather, it is integral to law as 
it is. Mandela advances a conception of “professional duty” which opera-
tively respects and admires both the law and its judicial institution, even 
as the pervasive legal oppressions of apartheid are being brought to bear 
on him (Derrida “Refl ection” 15–16, 33–37). The law which calls forth 
this magnanimous regard is the law that incipiently extends beyond its 
determinate existence through certain enabling qualities which “tend 
toward universality,” such qualities as the generality of the law, equal-
ity before the law, and “the independence and impartiality of  . . . [the] 
judiciary” (Derrida “Refl ection” 17, 20–22; Mandela “Prepared to Die” 
9). These qualities are not ideals detached from a contrary legal reality, a 
reality of which Mandela was only too intimately aware (Long Walk 261, 
309–10). They are qualities intrinsic to the being of law, to its integral 
extensiveness.
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The dimension of law sustaining these qualities of generality, impar-
tiality and such (and they will be returned to later) could be extracted 
from the generality of law by way of Derrida’s “Force of Law.” There 
Derrida would want to “make explicit or perhaps produce a diffi cult and 
unstable distinction between justice and law, between justice (infi nite, 
incalculable, rebellious to rule and foreign to symmetry . . .) and the ex-
ercise of justice as law, legitimacy or legality, a . . . calculable apparatus 
[dispositif], a system of regulated and coded prescriptions” (250). “Force 
of Law” was prefi gured in Derrida’s “The Laws of Refl ection: Nelson 
Mandela, in Admiration” where the “superior law” (27) which Mandela 
embraces can be retrospectively equated with this “exercise of justice 
as law” in “Force,” with justice as it is realized by law, and as it thence 
and integrally subsists in law. This perception is a making experiential 
of a justice, which it is impossible to experience in itself, even as that 
denies justice in its plenitude. For law to be in such a relation to justice 
it must be utterly responsive, “without history, genesis, or any possible 
derivation. That would be the law of the law” (“Before the Law” 19—his 
emphasis, but conveniently for me). It is in the operative combining of 
the law in its determinate dimension with this law of the law importing 
law’s vacuity, and hence law’s incipient possibility, that Mandela is in 
Derrida’s estimation “a man of the law by vocation” (“Refl ection” 35). 
Mandela is then not an idealist. He is a realist but one who sees more in 
the real, and in the realizable, more than others see.
III. Law like Literature
The affi nity between law and literature can illumine this dimension of 
law, the dimension enabling law to bring possibility into normatively 
determinate existence. The affi ne can be a troublesome category, how-
ever, and it has proved to be so here. “Law and literature” has become a 
settled enough fi eld when it entails exploring literary depictions of the 
juridical, or when it comes to extracting literary qualities from an at 
times reluctant law (Aristodemou 8, 22). What remains challenging is 
the identifi cation of law with literature (Tuitt 78). This would seem to 
go against law’s being tied to ‘reality,’ a constraint which would contrast 
law to literature, a constraint from which literature could liberate law, 
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perhaps (Aristodemou 262–63; Goodrich). In the alternative, as it were, 
the contrast between law and literature corresponds to a necessary sepa-
ration. Most notably, of course, there is Plato with his supposed hostil-
ity to the poet—the poet who confounds the laws by calling everything 
into question by making “the words of poetry similar to whatever he 
[the poet] happens to be or regards virtue or wickedness” (Plato para. 
656c). Poetry opposes law as imagined worlds oppose what is ‘real,’ as 
the possible opposes the actual and the established (Aristodemou 18–
19, 180). Yet literature itself is often seen as the slave of the determinate, 
as ultimately serving certain specifi c and usually oppressive interests 
(Aristodemou 5–6), and this not just as a matter of its variable contents 
but in its very genres—a location that has proved troubling on this score 
to postcolonial writers (Ashcroft, Griffi ths and Tiffi n 181–87). Can the 
novel, for example, surpass the bourgeois origins with which Said would 
saddle it (Culture and Imperialism 84, 92–93)?
If these issues suggest some similarity with law’s determinate dimen-
sion (a similarity taken up later), a reversal of the comparison suggests 
another. Returning to “Force of Law,” Derrida’s initiating engagement 
with Montaigne would equate “historical or positive” law with what is 
“fi ctional,” with what is “artifi ce” (240). Likewise, it would seem, with 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s “juris-fi ction” the law is that which is “modeled or 
sculpted (fi ctum) in terms of right” . . . Since the case is not only unfore-
seen but has to be so, and since right is given as the case of its own utter-
ance, so judicial discourse shows itself to be the true discourse of fi ction” 
(Finite Thinking 156–57). Put in another perspective, if the situation of 
the case were entirely foreseeable or stilled, it would be given ‘fact’ and 
there would be no call for decision, for determination, for law. There 
would be no fi ctive making the case speak. What is always involved with 
law, then, is the creative reaching out to a possibility beyond its determi-
nate existence, a beyond where law ‘fi nds itself ’ in being integrally tied 
to, and incipiently encompassing of, its exteriority. For Nancy, again, 
this would be the “law of the law itself [which] is always without law. 
The law overhangs all cases, but is itself the case of its institution;” hence 
“the law is able to be here, there, now, in this case, in this place . . .” 
(Corpus 48).2 
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Taking now a condign account of “literature” from the many that 
Maurice Blanchot would offer, this one being apt because it is a pre-
lude to his conception of right, we fi nd that literature is an “opening” 
to what is beyond, to alterity and possibility, to “what is when there 
is no more world,” or “to what would be if there were no world,” to 
“the void” (“Literature” 388). But this void is of the kind encountered 
by Blanchot’s protagonist in The Madness of the Day for whom it was 
disappointing, a void which inexorably becomes “a presence” and pro-
tean: “one realizes the void, one creates a work” (Madness 8; “Literature” 
395). Between the realized and the unrealizable, between the appropri-
ated and that which is still “ours for being nobody’s,” there is a “shift-
ing,” a “passing,” a “movement” impelled by “a marvelous force” which 
is the impossibility of the movement being otherwise. This is an activ-
ity always situated, an emplaced “affi rmation,” “an operation” which 
cannot be separated “from its results” (Unavowable 29; “Literature” 363, 
365, 369, 387, 389). 
Literature for Blanchot, then, is a work like any other—he in-
stances building a stove—even if it is such “to an outstanding degree” 
(“Literature” 371). Law and literature, it could now be said, share 
the same ambivalence between existent instantiation and what is ever 
beyond yet incipient in it.3 The comparison between law and literature 
more usually points to their opposition, of course. Literature’s realms 
of the imagined and the possible oppose the all-too-solid certainty of 
law—that law-confounding power of Plato’s poets for example. Yet it is 
exactly the aspect of literature to which Plato would putatively object, 
to its illimitable inventiveness and its quality of fi ction, which impels 
law’s making. And despite the incessant jurisprudential efforts to render 
law as ‘positive’, as posited, or as fact, society, economy, and so on, it 
refuses being in “a world sapped by crude existence” (“Literature” 395, 
for the phrase). Peremptorily, the legal fi ction can illustrate the forma-
tive location of law beyond existence, for with the fi ction the enounced 
content of the particular law remains the same whereas operatively, and 
by way of the fi ction, that content has changed to its opposite. So, and 
for example, in Roman law only Roman citizens could initiate certain 
litigation, but foreign litigants were able to do the same because of a 
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fi ction deeming them to be citizens for the purpose (Maine 21). Thus, 
in Blanchot’s terms, a fi ction is “truth and also indifference to truth” 
(“Literature” 396–97).
IV. The Law of the Law
Paralleling, and the culmination of, this engagement with “literature,” 
we fi nd that for Blanchot the law of the law is inseparable from law and 
right (“Literature” 375–78). Law ‘in’ and of itself is quite uncontained 
and unsubordinated, a self-affi rmation made “without reference to any-
thing higher: to it alone, pure transcendence” (The Step 25).4 This law 
takes its instituted existence from its being beyond. “Let us grant,” says 
Blanchot, “that the law is obsessed with exteriority, by that which be-
leaguers it and from which it separates via the very separation that in-
stitutes it as form, in the very movement by which it formulates this 
exteriority as law” (Infi nite Conversation 434). This exteriority which 
is yet of the law, this law of the law, entails for Blanchot “a responsibil-
ity . . . towards the Other” that is “irreducible to all forms of legality 
through which one necessarily tries to regulate it,” but which ultimately 
“cannot be enounced in any already formulated language” (Unavowable 
Community 43).
Matching this law of the law now with the dimensions derived from 
law earlier, it could be said that law ‘is’ the settlement in terms of a 
normative continuity of the existential divide between a determinate 
positioning and a responding to what is beyond position, and it is in 
the necessity yet impossibility of such settlement that law is iteratively 
impelled into existence. In their separation yet inexorable combining, 
these two dimensions form the horizon of law, a moving horizon—the 
horizon both as a condition and quality of law’s contained existence, 
and the horizon as opening onto all that lies beyond this existence. Law’s 
position within that horizon cannot be at all ironically set. 
To give emphasis to this responsive dimension of law is to go against 
the epochal elevation of occidental law’s determinate dimension over 
the responsive. Yet this emphasis is hardly to deny that, if law continu-
ally becomes itself and is sustained in its responsiveness to exteriority, 
there must nonetheless be a positioned place where this responsiveness 
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can be made determinate. That which is purely beyond is merely inac-
cessible, and out of responsive range. Law always returns to determinate 
position, and to sustain position there must be some shielding from an 
importunate responsiveness. There has, with any law, to be a constant, 
reductive effort to ensure that “the aleatory margin . . . remains homo-
geneous with calculation, within the order of the calculable” (Derrida 
“Psyche” 55). So, even though law has to exceed all fi xity of determi-
nation, has to in order to remain pervaded by the relation to what is 
beyond, labile and protean to an illimitable extent, there has also to be 
an accessible ordinariness to law’s extraordinary responsiveness. This re-
sponsiveness is something commonplace in processes of legal decision-
making and in the quotidian claims, which law’s adherents make on one 
another. The sense of originating, “the sense/ Of cold and earliness is a 
daily sense” (Stevens 123). 
V. Consequences
The affi nity I have tried to sketch between law and the postcolonial, by 
way of the idea of literature, has been in terms of a mutually supportive 
similarity between them. That endeavor took its initiating impetus from 
Boire’s confi guring of law and postcolonial literatures. Whilst there was 
agreement that in the colonial situation law embedded the interest of 
the colonist in a “hierarchical orthodoxy” (202, 204), I sought to am-
plify Boire’s intimations that law, like the postcolonial, surpassed and 
disrupted such containment. Now, in something of a counter-correc-
tive, I will conclude by implicating law’s surpassing as itself as cause of 
the containment, only then to indicate and illustrate how law’s surpass-
ing ultimately does surpass.
To set this closing enquiry, we could return to the disturbing point 
about literary genres, to their constituent implication with the specifi c 
histories and powers that generated them. In an immediate way, that 
would seem to be at odds with the illimitable openness of Blanchot’s 
“literature” until we remember that literature, like law, is for Blanchot 
(also) an existent “work” in the world (“Literature” 371), that it is some 
realization of an unrealizable which is inexorably compromised in the 
process. With law, the situation is even more stark for, canonical fi ats 
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aside, law is unlike literature in its intrinsically requiring an authorita-
tive realization ‘for the time being,’ a determinative bringing of what 
is beyond into the normatively determinate. If law is to be able to do 
this, as we saw, it must be quite unrestrained. It cannot be attached to 
a past, even its own past, or to anything else (Derrida “Before the Law” 
190). Yet, and here is where the counter-corrective comes in, law’s un-
restrained responsiveness, its lack of any confi ning ties, results in its not 
having any enduring content of its own. Law always depends for its very 
content and for much of its force on some power apart from itself.
However, what also must follow from law’s refusal of any primal 
attachment is that its taking on of content is always to be mediated 
through law itself. No matter how seemingly abject law’s dependence in 
this, law will itself endow its borrowed contents with its own force and 
meanings, meanings which will often differ markedly from their source 
apart from law.5 Also, law will not simply absorb and recreate some sin-
gular source but will draw on many such, and even where law determi-
nately elevates one source over another, this is not to exclude the other 
fi nally, much less to elevate the included pervasively.
A fi nal consequence, now, of the vacuity that comes from law’s in-
trinsically incorporative regard for what is ever beyond: this regard does 
not, or does not just, involve a denial of determinate content but in-
volves, rather, the responsive opening of that content to the possibil-
ity of being otherwise, to becoming an effect of this possibility. This 
refl ects, in a different light, Boire’s telling depiction of how law’s ‘uni-
versalizing and neutralizing rhetoric,’ law’s generality,’ serves particular 
imperial interests by elevating them to some absolute condition. Whilst 
monotonously agreeing with that assessment also, let me extend law’s 
self-subversion to this scene as well. That will involve a quality found in 
any generative legal concept, but only two will be selected here, those 
singled out by Boire and, as we saw, exalted by Mandela: the neutrality 
and the generality of law. As for neutrality, or impartiality as it is usu-
ally put, its legal force could be conveyed, at least obliquely, by looking 
at an example of its opposite, the political trial. Such a trial is not con-
sidered to be legal because some power apart from law determines the 
outcome. We tend to see this as a subterfuge, as something being pre-
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sented as law that is not law. But what is it about law that this offends? 
After all law’s dependence on power apart from it has just been empha-
sized. Yet, as we also saw, at the same time law cannot be ultimately 
beholden to a power apart from itself. Much of that is conveyed by 
law’s impartiality. The lack of containing ties to the existent that comes 
with law’s responsive dimension orients it towards an absence of attach-
ment in its ‘application.’ Yet impartiality is not fi nally feasible since it 
becomes inevitably compromised in the infl uence-ridden scene of ap-
plication, in the judicial decision for example. This inevitable diminish-
ing, however, does not counter the integrity of the quality of impartial-
ity. This much can be discerned negatively in that it would not be an 
answer to a failure of impartiality to say that one was impartial in part. 
Within the determinate, within the realized law there would still subsist 
the unrealized possibility of its opening to, or falling into, being other-
wise—the possibility of its being without the partiality of its determi-
nate existence. This possibility always remains anterior to the law iter-
ably made determinate. The incipience of impartiality remains within 
that law. So positioned, impartiality is a “manner of being” in law (cf. 
Derrida “Negotiations” 13). 
Likewise with law’s generality. Because of the requirement that laws 
be general, it used often to be said that a putative law effecting a specifi c 
determination does not count as law (Locke 396; Rousseau 82). So, leg-
islating for the specifi c liability of a specifi c wrongdoer would not count 
as law, as opposed to a law prescribing a general standard of liability for 
all wrongdoers generically categorized. Yet, if the general cannot fi nd 
itself in that determinate existence of law which would result from a 
specifi c determination, it cannot be so general that it adheres to noth-
ing specifi c and has no operative content. Hence the common and para-
doxical requirement that law’s “generality must be specifi c” (Neumann 
28). The generality of law will always be countered in its specifi c ‘appli-
cation,’ but within that specifi city there is always the incipience of law’s 
extending in its generality and being otherwise. In such ways, as with its 
impartiality and generality, law moves beyond the assertion of particu-
lar power and receptively responds to possibility. Its strength, like the 
poet’s, is the lack of strength, and the lack in strength:
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Spender told Auden he wondered whether he, Spender, ought 
to write prose. But Auden put his foot down. “You must write 
nothing but poetry, we do not want to lose you for poetry.” 
“But do you really think I’m any good?” gulped Spender. “Of 
course,” Auden frigidly replied. “But why?” “Because you are 
so infi nitely capable of being humiliated. Art is born of humili-
ation.” (Fenton 248)6
Notes
 1  See, for example, Fitzpatrick (‘Transformations’ and ‘Crime as Resistance’). For 
an opening out by way of ‘law and literature’ to other perspectives beyond law, 
and colonial law, as usually conceived see Manji (“Mask Dancing,” “Someday” 
and “Law, Literature, Labour”).
 2  My translation.
 3 Signifi cant orientations of works of literature, but not of the idea of literature 
itself, towards the law of the law are provided by Butler (33–55) and Ramshaw.
 4 A beautiful elaboration of this conception of literature and a relating of it to law 
can be found in Foucault (“Blanchot”).
 5 The situation is adroitly rendered in Blanchot’s picaresque, The Madness of the 
Day, in which the feminine law emanates from “me:” she is “born of the one for 
whom she becomes the law,” and she is abjectly dependent on this all-powerful, 
determinate one (14–15). Then that dependence is inverted by the law herself. 
Having become the law, she then comes from beyond me and denies me a place 
anywhere and the ability to do anything: “she exalted me, only to raise herself up 
in her turn” (16).
 6 The supportive strength that comes with Sara Ramshaw’s invaluable research 
assistance must also be recorded. And returning to the combination of kindness 
and editors, I am grateful for the thoughtfulness of Cheryl Suzack.
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